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COST AND JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS
IN THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL FOR INDIGENTS'
DISCRETIONARY APPEALS-ROSS v. MOFFITT
In Ross v. Moffitt,' the United States Supreme Court held that to deny
an indigent defendant the aid of counsel in a discretionary appeal did not
violate the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth
amendment. This holding appears to clearly answer the question of
whether the right to counsel extends to discretionary reviews, a question
the Supreme Court left unanswered 2 in Douglas v. California.3  The pur-
pose of this Note is to explore the "right to counsel" analysis in Ross, ex-
amine some of the questions which remain unanswered, and weigh the
Court's decision in terms of cost and judicial management.
. The litigation which brought this case to the Supreme Court began with
two separate cases. Claude Moffitt was convicted in the superior courts
of North Carolina of forgery and uttering a forged instrument. Defense
counsel for the indigent Moffitt was appointed in both cases. Upon con-
viction, Moffitt took separate appeals, again with the assistance of ap-
pointed counsel. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed both
convictions.4
Following the first conviction, appointed counsel was allowed to prepare
and file a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking to invoke the discretion-
ary review5 of the North Carolina Supreme Court. The petition was
1. 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
2. We are not here concerned with problems that might arise from the de-
nial of counsel for the preparation of a petition for discretionary or manda-
tory review beyond the stage in the appellate process at which the claims
have once been presented by a lawyer and passed upon by an appellate
court.
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356 (1963).
3. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
4. State v. Moffitt, 9 N.C. App. 694, 177 S.E.2d 324 (1970); State v. Moffitt,
11 N.C. App. 337, 181 S.E.2d 184 (1971).
5. In this Note an appeal of right refers to the mandatory review procedure
granted to a defendant by an intermediate appellate court to review the merits of the
case. In North Carolina the right is guaranteed by statute. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-
27(b) (Supp. 1973). Permissive review or discretionary review, is exercised at the
discretion of the state's highest appellate court. In this case permissive review is gov-
erned by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31(c) (1969) which provides, in part, that certifica-
tion by the supreme court may be made when:
(1) The subject matter of the appeal has significant public interest, or
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denied for lack of a substantial constitutional question.6 Moffitt then peti-
tioned for appointment of counsel to assist in the preparation of a peti-
tion for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. This petition was
also denied.
Following the second conviction, the superior court of appeals refused
to appoint counsel to assist in a petition for certiorari in the North Carolina
Supreme Court. Having exhausted his state post-conviction remedies, 7
Moffitt filed for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court
for the Western District of North Carolina. He alleged that the state's
refusals to appoint counsel to assist him in preparing petitions for writs
of certiorari in both the North Carolina Supreme Court and the United
States Supreme Court were abridgements of his constitutional right to
counsel. This petition for habeas corpus was denied and the cases were
consolidated on appeal in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded the case to the district court
stating that an indigent defendant in a criminal case is entitled to assigned
counsel on appeal to the state's highest appellate court or to the United
States Supreme Court." The court concluded that there was, after all, no
basis for differentiating appeals of right and permissive appeals. 9
The Supreme Court granted certiorari' 0 to consider the case in light of
Douglas and previous conflicting decisions of the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh and Tenth Circuits." In reversing the court of appeals, the Court
in a six to three decision appears to have closed the door that Gideon v.
(2) The cause involves legal principles of major significance to the jurispru-
dence of the state, or...
(3) The decision of the Court of Appeals appears likely to be in conflict
with a decision of the Supreme Court.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31(c) (1969).
6. State v. Moffitt, 279 N.C. 396, 183 S.E.2d 246 (1971).
7. After being denied assistance of counsel in filing a petition for certiorari,
Moffitt filed a pro se application to the state supreme court. The application for
appeal was denied for tardiness. Moffitt v. Ross, 483 F.2d 650, 651 (4th Cir. 1973).
8. id. at 653.
9. Id. at651.
10. Ross v. Moffitt, 414 U.S. 1128 (1974). Counsel was appointed and a motion
for Moffitt to proceed in forma pauperis was granted. Ross v. Moffitt, 415 U.S. 909
(1974).
11. In Peters v. Cox, 341 F.2d 575 (10th Cir. 1965) the court held that the New
Mexico Supreme Court was not required to appoint counsel for indigent criminal de-
fendants seeking appeals from the state supreme court to the United States Supreme
Court. In United States ex rel. Pennington v. Pate, 409 F.2d 757 (7th Cir. 1969)
the court held it was not a denial of equal protection to refuse appointment of counsel




Wainwright12 had opened to indigent criminal defendants. To understand
the importance of the Ross v. Moffitt decision, it is necessary to examine
the Court's previous decisions pertaining to the right to counsel.
RIGHT TO COUNSEL-SIXTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS
AND EQUAL PROTECTION
The sixth amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defense."'1 3 The right secured seems narrow enough, but the breadth
of the phrase, despite its seemingly narrow language, might be construed
so as to apply to any defendant, at any stage of the criminal proceeding.
14
The litigation in this area, therefore, has focused primarily on the applica-
ton of the sixth amendment's guarantee to the various stages of the crim-
inal process.
In Powell v. Alabama 5 the Court extended the right to appointed coun-
sel to indigent defendants in a state criminal trial.' 6 Powell was the first
definitive case in this area, 17 laying the foundation for the subsequent evo-
lution of the right to counsel. Reversing the convictions of four defend-
ants who were denied the benefit of counsel, the Court held that such a
denial of counsel in a capital case would be a denial of a "necessary req-
uisite of due process of law."'
8
12. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
13. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
14. See Boskey, The Right to Counsel in Appellate Proceedings, 45 MINN. L.
REv. 783 (1961).
15. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
16. Although the right to counsel appears only in the sixth amendment, the Court
has relied heavily on the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth
amendment to apply this provision to the states. The right to counsel in federal
criminal proceedings was first pronounced in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
The right to counsel was extended to appeals in Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S.
565 (1957). The application of the right to counsel has now been taken from the
realm of case law by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which provide:
(a) Right to Assigned Counsel. Every defendant who is unable to obtain
counsel shall be entitled to have counsel assigned to represent him at every
stage of the proceedings from his initial appearance before the federal mag-
istrate or the court through appeal, unless he waives such appointment.
FED. R. CRiM. P. 44(a).
17. Although the Court did not directly address itself to the sixth amendment
right to counsel until Powell in 1932, the Court had ventured into the area when state
action offended due process. See, e.g., Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925);
Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915);
Andersen v. Treat, 172 U.S. 24 (1898).
18. 287 U.S. at 71. The Court's language has since become a touchstone for sub-
1975]
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Although Powell was the first case to use the "special circumstances"
language, the holding of the case was confined to its facts. It was not
until the Court decided Betts v. Brady' 9 that the "special circumstances"
referred to in Powell were formalized as a judicial test to be applied in
subsequent cases.
Asserted denial [of counsel) is to be tested by an appraisal of the totality
of facts in a given case. That which may, in one setting, constitute a denial
of fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice, may, in
other circumstances, and in light of other considerations, fall short of such
denial.20
The pronouncement of the "special circumstances" test brought with it
a number of perplexing problems. There was no statement in the Betts
decision that due process required the right to counsel to be applied uni-
formly in future cases involving similar circumstances. 21  As a result, in
subsequent cases the Court limited its holding to the specific facts before
it. Decisions following Betts either found that "special circumstances"
existed, or that they did not-the line between the two was indeed a thin
one.
2 2
Gideon ended the controversy surrounding the application of the "special
circumstances" test. The sixth amendment right to counsel was uniformly
sequent decisions relating to an indigent defendant's right to counsel.
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill
in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally,
of determining for himself whether the indictment- is good or bad. He is
unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he
may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompe-
tent evidence, or evidence irrelevent to the issue or otherwise inadmissible.
He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense,
even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of coun-
sel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be
not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how
to establish his innocence. If that be true of men of intelligence, how much
more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect. If
in any case, civil or criminal, a state or federal court were arbitrarily to
refuse to hear a party by counsel, employed by and appearing for him, it
reasonably may not be doubted that such a refusal would be a denial of a
hearing, and, therefore, of due process in the constitutional sense.
Id. at 69.
19. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
20. Id. at 462.
21. Id. at 461-62.
22. Following the Betts rule, the Court found "special circumstances" in Cash v.
Culver, 358 U.S. 633 (1959) (defendant was a 20 year old uneducated farm boy);
Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957) (17 year old defendant only had seventh
grade education); Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105 (1954) (defendant was a mental
patient confined to a strait jacket); Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948) (defendant
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applied to the states23 as a part of due process. The Betts decision was
expressly overruled; 24 however, the confusion was far from over. Assum-
ing that indigent defendants were always guaranteed the right to counsel
in state proceedings, when did the right to counsel begin?
In the cases since Gideon, the Court has used the "critical stage" test
to answer this question. The crucial factor which differentiates the "spe-
cial circumstances" test from this test is that with the "critical stage" analy-
sis the right to counsel is not necessarily limited to the facts of the case
before the Court. Once the Court has declared that the right to counsel
attaches to a particular stage in the criminal process, 25 the assignment of
counsel becomes itself a procedural step which must be adhered to in all
future cases regardless of the circumstances. This test extends the right
to counsel beyond representation at trial.2
6
Although the Court has relied primarily on the due process clause in
extending the right to counsel, Douglas v. California applied the right to
the first appeal 27 by the use of the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment. 28  The Court held "[T]hat equality [is] demanded by
was an inexperienced 18 year old youth); Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561 (1947)
(18 year old defendant did not understand English). "Special circumstances" were
not found in Quicksall v. Michigan, 339 U.S. 660 (1950) (defendant was 44 years
old, had previous convictions and prior court experiences); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S.
640 (1948) (charges were stated in simple terms not capable of being misunderstood
by defendant, a 57 year old man); Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 (1946) (nature
and consequences of guilty plea were fully explained in capital case to defendant with
no formal education).
23. Although the Court in Gideon applied the right to counsel in felony cases,
it extended the right to misdemeanor cases in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25
(1972). Thus, every indigent defendant is guaranteed the right to counsel in any
state criminal prosecution where he faces a possible loss of his liberty.
24. 372 U.S. at 345.
25. It is beyond the scope of this Note to consider the application of the right
to counsel in administrative or quasi-criminal proceedings. In a criminal proceeding
the Court notes, "that appointment of counsel for an indigent is required at every
stage ...where substantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected." Mempa
v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967).
26. See, e.g., Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (state pre-trial hearing);
Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (combined probation revocation and sentenc-
ing hearing); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (line-ups); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (police interrogation); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478 (1964) (interrogation while in police custody); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S.
52 (1961) (arraignment). But see United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 301 (1973) (coun-
sel denied at pre-trial photographic display of defendant); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S.
682 (1972) (pre-indictment interrogation); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263
(1967) (handwriting exemplar).
27. See note 2 supra.
28. 372 U.S. 353. The Court's analysis relies heavily on its earlier decision in
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the Fourteenth Amendment where the rich man, who appeals as of right,
enjoys the benefit of counsel's examination into the record . . . while the
indigent. . . is forced to shift for himself."'29
The Court in Douglas raised as many questions as it answered. Is there
a beginning and an end to the concept that equal protection demands the
same treatment for the poor man and the rich man? Does equal protec-
tion of the law demand that an indigent defendant be able to utilize coun-
sel in the same way as the rich man, from the moment of arrest to the
last day of his sentence? The Court, recognizing that these questions
exist, stated, "[a]bsolute equality is not required; lines can be and are
drawn and we often sustain them."'30  The question remained where and
how these lines were to be drawn. Ross v. Molitt draws a very distinct
line;3 ' a line that perhaps defines the absolute boundaries of an indigent's
right to counsel on appeal.
Griffin, Douglas, and ROSS-INDIGENTS RIGHTS TO
APPELLATE REVIEW
In Ross, the Court drew heavily on the language and reasoning estab-
lished in Griffin v. Illinois3 2 and Douglas v. California. Although both
of these cases were grounded primarily on denial of equal protection, 33
the Court analyzed Moffitt's claim in terms of both due process and equal
protection.3 4
In light of the Court's previous decisions concerning the right to counsel
it seems to naturally follow that the due process analysis in Ross would
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). Taken together, these two cases form the
basis for the Court's subsequent decisions which have broadened the right to counsel.
29. 372 U.S. at 358.
30. Id. at 357.
31. ihe fact that a particular service might be of benefit to an indigent
defendant does not mean that the service is constitutionally required. The
duty of the State under our cases is not to duplicate the legal arsenal that
may be privately retained by a criminal defendant in a continuing effort to
reverse his conviction, but only to assure the indigent defendant an adequate
opportunity to present his claims fairly in the context of the State's appel-
late process.
417 U.S. at 616.
32. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
33. The Court in Ross was not completely satisfied with this conclusion, contend-
ing that support for both Griffin and Douglas could be found in the equal protection
clause and the due process clause, neither clause by itself being "entirely satisfactory."
417 U.S. at 608-09.
34. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit analyzed the case in terms of
due process. However, in rejecting the equal protection analysis the court stated:
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reflect the application of the "critical stage" test. Such is not the case.35
Although the Court does differentiate between the various stages of adver-
sary proceedings, the "critical stage" language does not appear anywhere.
Instead the Court, in diluted terms, simply concludes that "there are signif-
icant differences between the trial and appellate stages of a criminal pro-
ceeding."36 Justice Douglas, dissenting, uses more forceful language in re-
lation to the "critical stage" test, but does not use the term specifically.
"The right to discretionary review is a substantial one, and one where a
lawyer can be of significant assistance to an indigent defendant. 37
The apparent rationale behind the majority's conclusion is that it is the
"defendant rather than the State, who initiates the appellate process, seek-
ing not to fend off the efforts of the State's prosecutor but rather to over-
turn a finding of guilt made by a judge or jury below." s38 The Court
recognizes and re-emphasizes the importance of counsel at the trial stage,
but states that on appeal the attorney is no longer needed as a shield to
protect the presumption of innocence; rather, he is used by the defendant
"as a sword to upset the prior determination of guilt."139
The Court deems this difference significant, despite the fact that Douglas
looms in the background, proudly declaring that indigent defendants are
guaranteed the right to counsel on appeals of right.40  It would seem,
then, within the bounds of reason, and contrary to the Court's decision,
that the right to counsel in discretionary appeals is simply a logical ex-
This record provides an insufficient basis for a finding or a conclusion
that North Carolina's administration of her statute works a denial of equal
protection of the laws to some indigent appellants. It may not be amiss,
however, to note that such a problem may be lurking in this case....
483 F.2d at 652.
35. In oral arguments before the Supreme Court, counsel for the state contended
that discretionary review cannot 'be a "critical stage." 42 U.S.L.W. 3605 (1974).
36. 417 U.S. at 610.
37. Id. at 621 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
38. Id. at 610.
39. Id. at 610-11.
40. It is not clear on what basis the decision in Douglas rested. 417 U.S. at 608-
09. See note 33 supra. Douglas' mandate, however, does appear to be clear.
The clear thrust of Douglas is that the indigent criminal appellant must
be given a fair method of raising substantial challenges to his conviction.
Certainly one standard of fairness is what the state provides for those who
can afford to pay their own way. The Court stopped short of this standard.
• . . That this is not logically equal protection does not detract from the
fact that it is practically due process.
Gerard, The Right to Counsel on Appeal in Missouri: A Limited Inquiry into the
Factual and Theoretical Underpinnings of Douglas v. California, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q.
463, 481.
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tension of the right to counsel in mandatory appeals guaranteed by
Douglas.4 1
The ramifications of the Court's equal protection analysis are more pro-
found and far-reaching. In Griffin v. Illinois the Court held that limiting
the appellate process to defendants who could afford to pay for steno-
graphic transcripts violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 42 In so holding the Court stated, "[t]here can be no equal
justice where the kind of a trial a man gets depends on the amount of
money he has."'4
8
In a line of subsequent cases, the Court has held that a state cannot
impede the right to appeal by indigent defendants while allowing more af-
fluent persons to appeal unrestricted. 44 Although these cases applied pri-
marily to the right to transcripts and fees, Douglas clearly applied this
principle to access to the appellate system.
In applying an equal protection analysis to this case, the Court required
that North Carolina meet only two conditions: the state appellate system
must be "free from unreasoned distinctions" 45 and indigent defendants must
be given an adequate opportunity within the appellate system to fairly pre-
sent their claims.48  The Court held that North Carolina satisfied both of
these requirements by statute.47
41. Chief Judge Haynsworth, speaking for a unanimous court of appeals, stated:
On principle, however, we can find no logical basis for differentiation be-
tween appeals of right and permissive review procedures in the context of
the Constitution and the right to counsel.
483 F.2d at 653.
Justice Harlan, dissenting in Douglas, stated:
Surely, it cannot be contended that the requirements of fair procedure are
exhausted once an indigent has been given one appellate review.
372 U.S. at 366 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
42. 351 U.S. at 18-19.
43. Id. at 19.
44. The Court has consistently struck down financial burdens placed on indigent
defendants. Such restrictions on the right to appeal are violative of equal protection.
See Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971) (trial transcripts given to indigent only
in felony cases); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963) (indigent defendant
could obtain trial transcript only if he convinced trial judge his appeal was not frivo-
lous); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963) (only a public defender could obtain free
transcript on coram nobis hearing); Smith v. Benett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961) (require-
ment of filing fees in habeas corpus action); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959) (fil-
ing fees); Chessman v. Teets, 354 U.S. 156 (1957) (defendant entitled to have coun-
sel represent him to settle trial transcript).
45. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966). The holding in this case is clearly
in the line established by Griffin. Here a state statute requiring an unsuccessful ap-
pellant to repay transcript costs was applied only to persons incarcerated.
46. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
47. See note 5 supra.
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In so holding it appears that the Court adopted the position espoused
by Justice Harlan in his dissents to Griffin and Douglas. He argued that
the states are prohibited from discriminating between rich and poor as such,
but the equal protection clause does not prevent the state from adopting
laws which may affect the poor more harshly than the rich. 48 The sole
criterion against which the state must measure its actions is whether
"[r]efusal to furnish criminal indigents with some things that others can
afford . . fallts] short of constitutional standards of fairness. ' 40
Douglas v. California holds that it is a violation of due process and
equal protection to deny an indigent defendant the aid of counsel on his
appeal of right; however, Ross holds that such denial on permissive ap-
peals violates neither guarantee. There must be a fundamental difference
between appeals of right and discretionary appeals which sanction this
dichotomy.
INDIGENTS, COUNSEL, AND DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
It is settled law that a state need not accord a defendant an appeal of
his conviction.5" It is equally clear that when a state does provide for
appeals, it must do so in accordance with the decision in Douglas. Most
states have complied with this requirement by statute, allowing the crim-
inal defendant an appeal of right to an intermediate court, and allowing
for discretionary review by the state's highest court. The Court in Ross
stated that after the defendant has exhausted his appeal of right he will
at least have had
a transcript or other record of trial proceedings, a brief on his behalf in the
Court of Appeals setting forth his claims of error, and in many cases an
opinion by the Court of Appeals disposing of his case. These materials,
supplemented by whatever submission respondent may make pro se, would
appear to provide the Supreme Court of North Carolina with an adequate
basis for its decision to grant or deny review. 5 1
48. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Every financial exaction which the State imposes on a uniform basis is
more easily satisfied by the well-to-do than by the indigent. Yet I take it
that no one would dispute the constitutional power of the State to levy a
uniform sales tax, to charge tuition at a state university, to fix rates for the
purchase of water from a municipal corporation, to impose a standard fine
for criminal violations, or to establish minimum bail for various categories
of offenses.
Id. at 361-62.
49. Id. at 363.
50. McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894). "[W]hether an appeal should be
allowed, and if so, under what circumstances or on what conditions, are matters for
each State to determine for. itself." Id. at 688.
51. 417 U.S. at 615.
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Possession of these resources, then, must be the crucial difference be-
tween the need for counsel on mandatory appeals and discretionary ap-
peals. The Court reasons that after an initial appellate review the defend-
ant is equipped with sufficient tools and resources to proceed pro se to
a fair adjudication of his case.
This rationale is buttressed by the Court's interpretation of the North
Carolina statute which provides that the state supreme court must exercise
its discretionary review power when the subject matter of the appeal has
significant public interest or involves major jurisprudential questions, or
when the decision in the lower court conflicts with a decision of the state
supreme court. 52 The Court concludes that:
[O]nce a defendant's claims of error are organized and presented in a law-
yerlike fashion to the Court of Appeals, the justices of the Supreme Court
of North Carolina who make the decision to grant or deny discretionary
review should be able to ascertain whether his case satisfies the standards
established by the legislature for such review.58
Although the Court presents its argument in forceful fashion, it admits
that an indigent defendant proceeding pro se on a discretionary appeal is
somewhat handicapped. 54  By exploring the nature of discretionary ap-
peals, the extent of this handicap can be seen.
Proceeding on appeal without the assistance of counsel55 presents a
thorny path to any defendant. 56 Petitions for writs of certiorari should
be carefully prepared, contain appropriate references to the trial record,
and present whatever data is necessary for an adequate understanding of
the issues before the Court. 57 In an address to the Pennsylvania Bar As-
52. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31(c) (1969).
53. 417 U.S. at 615.
54. The Court recognizes that "a skilled lawyer, particularly one trained in the
somewhat arcane art of preparing petitions for discretionary review, would . . . prove
helpful to any litigant able to employ him." Id. at 616.
55. The Court in its opinion also addresses itself to the issue of the right to coun-
sel on appeals to the United States Supreme Court. Although it rejects the authority
of Douglas and Griffin because they are applicable only to state action, it would seem
that an appellant proceeding on appeal to the United States Supreme Court would
face the same barriers encountered in the state appellate system. See STERN &
GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE (3d ed. 1962). See generally Zeigler & Her-
mann, The Invisible Litigant: An Inside View of Pro Se Actions in the Federal
Courts, 47 N.Y.U.L. Ry. 159 (1972).
56. "Analyzing and presenting a case from an appellate standpoint. . . calls par-
ticularly for the professional judgment of a lawyer, not merely a layman-even a lay-
man having far better education and learning than most indigent defendants." Bos-
key, supra note 14, at 786. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
57. See Furness, Withy & Co. v. Yang-Tsze Ins. Ass'n, 242 U.S. 430 (1917).
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sociation, Justice Brennan commented on the contents of petitions for
certiorari.
Both the petition and response should identify the federal questions al-
legedly involved, argue their substantiality, whether they were properly
raised in the state courts, whether they were decided by the state court con-
trary to controlling federal precedents, and whether in any event the state
court decision may rest on an independent state ground.58
Taking these requirements into consideration, it appears that the fac-
tors deemed important by the courts in deciding whether or not to grant
certiorari "are certainly not within the normal knowledge and experience
of an indigent appellant, unassisted by counsel. '59 Although the defend-
ant has an arsenal of weapons at his disposal on permissive appeals, he
may be unable to use them without the assistance of counsel to direct the
attack.
The Court in Ross reasoned that equal protection demands only that
the indigent defendant have an adequate opportunity to present his case
fairly through the state's appellate process.60  Chief Judge Haynsworth,
speaking for the appellate court in Ross, explained that although the pur-
pose of an intermediate court is to relieve the highest court of burdens,
the "[s]tate's highest court remains the ultimate arbiter of the rights of
its citizens." 61 In addition, Justice Douglas noted that an intermediate ap-
pellate court may be unable or unwilling to review a defendant's claims.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals, for example, will be constrained in
diverging from an earlier opinion of the State Supreme Court, even if sub-
sequent developments have rendered the earlier Supreme Court decision
suspect. 62
If a defendant proceeding without the aid of counsel cannot frame his
claims in an acceptable manner, or frame them in a way intelligible to
the court,63 the appellant, contrary to the majority's reasoning in Ross,
may not have an adequate opportunity to present his case.
58. Brennan, State Court Decisions and the Supreme Court, 31 PA. B. ASS'N Q.
393, 400 (1960).
59. Boskey, supra note 14, at 797.
60. 417 U.S. at 616.
61. 483 F.2d at 653.
62. 417 U.S. at 619-20 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
63. Pro se petitions are a particular problem for defendants who are incarcerated.
Petitions from prisoners are often a jumble of rambling factual assertions
and legal conclusions culled from the latest appellate reports that have made
the prison rounds. It is often impossible to identify the claims made or to
discern their factual or legal bases.
The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice,
TAsK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 54 (1967).
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COST AND JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT
Underlying the decision and reasoning in Ross are the problems of judi-
cial cost and management created by the extension of the right to coun-
sel.6 4 Cost in this context can be looked at from three different perspec-
tives. First, the extension of the right to counsel may be viewed as a fur-
ther tax on the resources of the state and federal judicial systems.65 There
is no doubt that the expansion of the right to counsel has placed some
strain on the courts. 60  Increased caseloads on most dockets have caused
delays in the judicial system, and the already heavy caseload before the
United States Supreme Court has become increasingly acute.6 7  Conse-
quently, one study group has suggested the implementation of a national
appellate court to screen cases on the Supreme Court's docket.68
The impact of this proposal is mitigated by the fact that lack of counsel
on discretionary appeals may be costing the judicial system a great deal
in terms of time and resources,60 which the expertise of counsel could
64. The states of Florida, Illinois, and Virginia filed amicus curiae briefs address-
ing themselves to the cost in terms of judicial management if the appellate court's
decision in Ross were not reversed. 417 U.S. at 602.
65. In oral arguments before the Supreme Court, counsel for the state of North
Carolina stated that complying with the appellate court's decision in Ross would cost
the state three and a quarter million dollars. 42 U.S.L.W. 3605 (1974).
66. Some observers feel that extending the right to counsel further will have se-
vere consequences in terms of judicial management. Dockets become increasingly
backlogged, more defendants go to trial rather than pleading guilty, and more appeals
are taken. E. FRIESEN, E. GALLAS & N. GALLAS, MANAGING THE COURTS, 48-49
(1971). Others feel that the courts have not effectively grasped the problems of
a rapidly expanding right to counsel. "A decade after Gideon the Question remains
whether we can indeed render effective assistance of counsel." LaFrance, Criminal
Defense Systems For the Poor, 50 NOTRE DAME LAw. 41, 43 (1974).
67. In forma pauperis cases now constitute over half of the cases on the Supreme
Court's docket. In 1941, 178 in forma pauperis petitions were filed. In 1971, 1,930
such petitions were filed, an increase of over ten-fold. REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP
ON THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT, 57 F.R.D. 573 (1972).
68. Id. Arthur Goldberg, retired Supreme Court Justice, has expressed his oppo-
sition to the Study Group's proposal that cases be screened.
Would Furman v. Georgia have reached the Supreme Court under the
screening plan by appellate judges proposed in the study group report?...
Would a national court of appeals have known that the Supreme Court was
prepared to overrule Betts v. Brady and hold that impoverished criminal de-
fendants must be given lawyers, or might it have dismissed the case of
Gideon v. Wainwright before it reached the Supreme Court? Would
Gideon's Trumpet have been heard?
Goldberg, One Supreme Court, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 10, 1973, at 14-15.
69. See note 63 supra.
[Als petitions from prisoners continue to flood the courts, there are no dis-.
senters from the position that both prisoners and courts would benefit if the
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greatly decrease.7 0  The court of appeals noted in Ross that, "[a]s our
legal resources grow, there is a correlative growth in our ability to imple-
ment basic notions of fairness."' 71 The court reasoned that the Bar is now
large enough to meet the requirements of Gideon and Argersinger v. Ham-
lin72 and an extension of the right to counsel on discretionary reviews is
a relatively minor burden to impose.78
A second view is that cost should be accorded no weight in our scheme
of justice. Chief Justice Burger commented that an "effective system of
justice is as important to the social, economic and political health of the
country as an adequate system of medical care is to our physical health. 74
He defined "effective" in terms of "delivery of justice" and admitted that
our delivery was "faltering and inadequate. '75 Would providing counsel
to indigent defendants cost less when viewed as part of the "delivery of
justice"?
[Tihere are few values a civilized society can put above giving a person
charged with a crime full process before it deprives him of his liberty or
life. If expenditures are required to procure the greatest possible insurance
against the abortion of justice, money could hardly be better spent. 76
A third perspective strikes a balance between the aforementioned views.
The Court in Ross adopts this position and defers the problem of assigning
weights to each side to the state legislatures.
We do not mean by this opinion to in any way discourage those States
which have ...made counsel available to convicted defendants at all
stages of judicial review. Some States which might well choose to do so as
a matter of legislative policy may conceivably find that other claims for
petitions were better prepared.
Symposium-Should the Appellate Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court
Be Changed? An Evaluation of the Freund Report Proposals, 27 RuTGERs L. REV.
937, 949 (1974).
70. Boskey, supra note 14, at 802.
71. 483 F.2d at 655.
72. 407 U.S. 25 (1972). See note 23 supra.
73. Moffitt v. Ross, 483 F.2d at 655. Many members of the legal community
felt that the Court's decision in Argersinger would strain the availability of counsel
to the limit. A recent study on this issue revealed "that Argersinger has had a much
lesser impact on the legal system than was contemplated before or at the time of the
decision." Ingraham, The Impact of Argersinger--One Year Later, 8 LAw & Soc.
REv. 615, 631 (1974).
74. Burger, Has the Time Come?, 55 F.R.D. 119, 123 (1972).
75. Id. See Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV.
1 (1973).
76. Day, Coming: The Right to Have Assistance of Counsel at All Appellate
Stages, 52 A.B.A.J. 135, 138 (1966).
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public funds within or without the criminal justice system preclude the im-
plementation of such a policy at the present time.77
In effect the Court is saying that the states may, if they wish, provide for
counsel for discretionary review procedures, but they need not do so if
other demands are placed on their public funds.
The Court in Ross v. Moffitt found that there is no constitutional man-
date that counsel be appointed to indigent defendants seeking discretion-
ary review. As a result, the indigent who has exhausted his appeal of
right will find further access to the appellate system difficult. As re-
sources within the judicial system become more readily available the door
may open again, but for the present, the door is closed.
Daniel R. Formeller
77. 417 U.S. at 618.
